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Job Evaluation and Wage Setting 
in the Public Sector of Israël 
Gedaliahu Harel 
This paper examines the Israeli expérience with 
spectoral job évaluation and incomes policy analysis, and 
the causes for the abortive attempt. 
Job évaluation and wage setting are common household terms 
in the kitchen of industrial relations. In most cases in the U.S.A. thèse 
terms are used in conjunction with a single organization and some-
times with a single industry. l In other countries, which are basically 
smaller than the United States, attempts were made to extend the job 
évaluation and wage setting process to entire sectors of the economy 
and, at times, to the economy as a whole.2 
After considérable labor unrest in the public sector, the Israeli 
Government reached the conclusion in 1961 that a fundamental recon-
sideration of the wage policies in the public sector had to be under-
taken in order to résolve once and for ail the confusion and compli-
cations of the past twelve years in the wage System of public servants. 
A detailed account of thèse problems is given in the section on historical 
and économie background which follows. The Government decided 
then, as in most cases of national importance, that the best way to go 
about finding a solution was to establish a public committee which 
would analyze the existing situation and recommend solutions. 
On November 12, 1961, a public committee headed by David 
Horowitz (then Head of the Bank of Israël) was appointed by the Gov-
ernment. The task Of the Commit- I HAREL, G., Faculty of Industrial and I 
t ee w a s def ined in the letter o f a p - Management Engineering, Israël In-
p o i n t m e n t as f o l l o w s : | stitute of Technology. Israël. J 
* I wish to thank Mr. Abraham Kaiser for his valuable assistance in the prépara-
tion of this paper. 
1
 Herbert G. ZOLLITSCH and Adolph LANGSNER, Wage and Salary 
Administration, 2d éd., Cincinnati, South-Western Publishing Co., 1970. 
2
 Martin P. OETTINGER, «Nation-wide Job Evaluation in the Netherlands. » 
Industrial Relations, v. 4, no. 1, October 1964, p. 45-59. 
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a. Examine the following matters and, if necessary, recommend changes: 
in wages and salary scales, grading methods, allowances and grants, 
rules governing promotion in job or grade. 
b. Recommend procédures for periodic re-examination of wage and salary 
scales, allowances and grants in the civil service as well as procédures 
for making changes in the above. 
c. Recommend arrangements for the co-ordination of job classification and 
grading in the civil service and public institutions, as well as methods 
of constant supervision of the proposed procédures. 
d. Make any recommendation likely to increase efficiency in matters 
concerning the fixing of civil service wage and salary scales, so as to 
prevent déviations from generally approved and agreed procédures.3 
Because of considérable pressure from the National Union of 
Government Employées, which found in a survey conducted at that time 
that the average wage of Government civil servants was sixteen percent 
less than that of municipal employées,4 the Government asked the 
Horowitz Committee on December 24, 1961, to also undertake the 
examination of wage policies in the local authorities and the religious 
councils.5 On August 20, 1962, the Government decided to extend the 
list of employées to be examined by the Committee to include the 
policemen and the prison service.6 
The Committee's délibérations were spread over a period of about 
a year and one half during which 142 sessions were conducted by the 
Committee itself; and eighty-four additional sessions were conducted 
by its sub-committees.7 On April 7, 1963, the Committee submitted its 
findings and recommendations in a published report, known popularly 
as the Horowitz Committee Report. A year later, after a séries of 
negotiations between the Government and the Histadrut (General 
Fédération of Labor), a collective agreement was signed by both sides 
to accept the major recommendations of the report. This agreement 
3
 Report of the Public Committee on Wages and Salaries of Civil Servants 
and Employées of Local Authorities and Religious Councils, Jérusalem, 1963, p. 3. 
4
 Yoram BARZILAI and Emanuel NAVON, «The Institutional Structure of the 
Government Civil Service and the N.U.G.E. (National Union of Government Employées) 
in Israël and its Impact Upon Labor Relations,» International Conférence on Trends 
in Industrial and Labor Relations, Tel Aviv, 1972, p. 7. 
5
 Report of the Public Committee..., p. 3. The religious councils are in charge 
of supplying the religious needs and services of the citizens of every locality. Thèse 
councils are under the administrative control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, but in 
matters of religion are subject to the authority of the Chief Rabbinate. 
6
 Ibid., p. 4. 
7
 lbid. 
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was preceded by a compromise between the Government and the 
academicians (civil servants with university degrees) according to which 
most of the recommendations of the Report would not be applied to 
them. This compromise marked the direction for the failure of the 
whole reform in the long run, since it triggered the same old vicious 
circle of demands and counter demands of the différent interest groups 
in the public sector of Israël. This paper describes the Israeli expérience 
with spectoral job évaluation and incomes policy analysis, and the 
causes for the abortive attempt. 
HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
In order to understand the full magnitude of the problem facing 
the Government at the end of 1961, a brief historical account of the 
major developments in wage policy in the public sector is necessary. 
After the establishment of the State of Israël in 1948, action was 
taken to organize the civil service. Within the framework of the orga-
nizational process a uniform scale of grades, which included ail Gov-
ernment employées other than manual workers, teachers and policemen, 
and which consisted of thirteen grades, was put into effect in February 
1949. In October of the same year a «Jobs Book» was created which 
related each job to one grade only. The local municipalités and other 
public institutions gradually changed over from their wage scales, either 
completely or with certain changes, to the uniform scale applied in the 
civil service. 
In the course of time, due to pressures from différent labor unions 
and professional associations, certain developments took place which 
contributed to growing déviations from the uniform scale: 
July 1950 — A décision was adopted to give an entertainment and 
Personal allowance to top executives in the civil service. 
August 1950 — A professional allowance was given to physicians. 
October 1950 — A professional allowance was given to ail academicians 
(civil servants with university degrees) as long as their éducation 
was required for the job they performed. 
1951 — It was decided that academicians would receive seniority 
promotion which would include the years they spent studying for 
their degrees. As a resuit of pressure from the association of 
physicians a separate grading scale for physicians was established. 
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1953 — As a resuit of mounting pressure from ail the professional 
associations Ave separate grading scales for academicians were 
established. This development aroused vigorous protests from the 
managerial employées and eventually a wage hike had to be given 
to appease them. 
1954 — The academicians demanded and obtained a wage increase. 
A pattern was established whereby after every wage hike granted 
to the academicians, a similar demand was raised by the man-
agerial employées, and vice versa. 
1958 — Demands for regarding of the engineers and top managerial 
executives were met. Later the regrading was applied to most 
civil servants as a disguise for a gênerai wage hike. 
1959 — Overtime allowance for time not worked was approved for 
many managerial positions. 
The culmination of this process came in 1961-1962 when no less 
than twenty-two strikes were undertaken by différent groups of public 
employées with the devastating results of tens of thousands of work 
days lost and agonizing suffering to the public. 
In addition to the deteriorating labor relations in the public sector, 
which the work of the Horowitz Committee was supposed to ameliorate, 
the Government also hoped to influence the inflationary trends and 
économie instability of the country through an incomes policy. Although 
the Horowitz Committee did not enter into detailed analysis of the 
économie situation of the country or of the impact of its recommen-
dations on this aspect, it made the following déclaration: 
Despite the considérable increase — at an average rate of 10 per cent 
per annum — in real national product during the last Ave years... the degree 
of progrès s has not been satisfactory. Local consumption per capita has 
risen at an average rate of 6 percent per annum consuming almost ail 
the growth in the net national product.... The problem of Israel's ability 
to compete economically has become more acute owing to the trends 
towards régional organization of states, and in particular as a resuit of 
the création of the European Common Market.8 
In view of the économie situation the Committee felt that, among 
its important tasks, its primary one should be: «Removing the dis-
tortions in the wage and salary relationships between grades, professions 
and places of work, which hâve accumulated in the course of time in 
the public service sector. »9 
8
 Ibid., p. 9. 
9
 Ibid., p. 10. 
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With thèse background facts in mind, the thirteen member Com-
mittee, including members of the Government, labor unions, employer 
représentatives and représentatives of the public, proceeded to de-
liberate in order to find solutions to some of the more difficult problems 
in Israël. While officially the Committee was to deal mainly with policies 
that directly involved only workers in the civil service and the local 
municipalities — about 100,000 employées10 — indirectly, the Com-
mittee's délibérations actually affected almost ail of the employées 
within the public sector, which at the time totaled about 179,000 out of 
about 813,200 in the total labor force. " 
The économie and political significance of any reform that might 
affect the income of twenty-two percent of the labor force in a small 
économie and political System like Israel's is self-explanatory. Yet, in 
the Israeli context, the political significance of the public sector em-
ployées1 constituency far exceeds its sheer number (as potential voters) 
as it includes in its ranks most of the Israeli party functionaires and, 
indeed, many of the positions within the civil service are filled on the 
basis of party affiliation. No wonder then that the Committee's délib-
érations were followed very closely not only by those who might be 
directly affected by its findings, but also by the Israeli public in gênerai. 
Ail this helped to make the Horowitz Committee a political issue even 
before the publication of its report. 
THE HOROWITZ COMMITTEE REPORT: BASIC PRINCIPLES 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Due to inadéquate direction and lack of gênerai policy outlines 
in the letter of appointment which the Committee received from the 
Government, the Horowitz Committee was forced in the course of its 
work to formulate four basic principles. Thèse constituted the basis 
on which it approached its task. The principles were: 
a. Fair pay for the public servant, taking into account the needs and 
abilities of the national economy, as well as the wage level in other 
économie sectors. 
b. Equal pay for work of equal value. This principle must provide the 
basis for any sound wage policy. Accordingly, in the public sector the 
10
 P. AZAY, «Job Evaluation and Classification of 100,000 Government and 
Public Service Employées,» Ha'aretz, February 21, 1964. 
11
 Israël. Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Information Division. Facts About Israël, 
1966, Jérusalem, Jérusalem Post Press, 1967? p. 125. 
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wage or salary payable for every post must be assessed with the aid 
of objective and uniform criteria. Thus every employée's pay must be 
determined solely by the post he is filling. The principle requires 
uniformity not only in pay but also in the working conditions in this 
sector (working hours, fringe benefîts, etc.). 
c. The simplification of the wage structure, and the élimination of 
distortions which hâve resulted both from the absence of a stable 
System and the resorting to improvised solutions which were not 
commensurate with a sound wage policy. 
d. Reasonable differentials within the scale and between grades, taking 
into account both the demands of the work and social factors.12 
THE METHOD OF JOB EVALUATION 
In the major task of establishing the job évaluation method the 
Horowitz Committee was aided by the work done previously by one of 
the members of the Committee, Professor Louis Guttman of the Hebrew 
University, and the Israël Institute of Applied Research. The first 
major work on job évaluation in Israël was prepared by a spécial 
technical committee, appointed by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in 
1956, and submitted in 1960. In this lengthy report Professor Guttman 
tried to tackle the weighty problem of how to build a job évaluation 
scheme which would enable the inclusion of différent jobs into one 
scale, indeed, how to devise a viable method which would produce a 
scale of ail the jobs in an industry, a sector and even the entire economy 
of a country. 
The first question which such a project must answer is how to go 
about defining in advance what items should be used for evaluating 
jobs? After lengthy field work with thousands of jobs Guttman establish-
ed that, in order that a criterion be included in an évaluation schedule, 
it should meet the following three requirements: 
a. The item must involve job analysis, i.e. describe the work being 
done. 
b. It should express level of advancement in work so that if one job 
is on a higher level according to this criterion than another, it 
should also be a more advanced job in the same line. 
c. The items should express level of work in terms which do no 
dépend upon the line of work. 
12
 Report of the Public Committee..., p. 10. 
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As a resuit of the testing of tens of criteria only seven criteria12a 
were found to correspond with the three requirements : 
1. Originality of thought and initiative required 
2. Judgement required 
3. The level of contact with people 
4. The level of expression 
5. The level of independence13 
6. Expérience 
7. General and professional knowledge 
8. Physical effort 
The report attached from four to seven degrees to each ciriterion 
with points allocated in an arithmetic progression.14 Thus, by combining 
the criteria with the possible levels one obtains a matrix which can 
categorize any job and which will form a ranked scale in an automatic 
fashion. The Horowitz Committee recommended that in each authority 
a six member committee representing the employer and the employées 
organization evaluate the jobs in the authority according to the above 
guidelines; and alternatively, where a single grade was currently attach-
ed to the post held by the employée (i.e. there was no range of 
grades) the employée should be graded on the new scale in a parallel 
grade, according to the comparative tables of new and old grades which 
the Committee prepared.15 
THE WAGE SETTING SYSTEM 
The Committee recommended that a uniform salary scale consist-
ing of twenty grades be established that would cover ail the employées 
of the Government, the local authorities and the religious councils 
regardless of their posts or professions. The salary would consist of 
four components : 
1. Basic salary — which would include the previous basic salary and 
ail allowances which the employée had before the establishment of 
the new uniform scale. 
12a
 The last cuterion was added by the Horowitz Committee as a resuit of a 
compromise. 
u
 Uzi PELED, «Principles of Job Evaluation in the Public Sector,» Netivei 
Irgun Uminhal, v. 10, no. 3, June 1964, p. 9-17. 
14
 Israël. Ministry of the Treasury. I4th Annual Report, Jérusalem, 1964, 
p. 135-141. 
15
 Report of the Public Committee..., p. 16. 
JOB EVALUATION AND WAGE SETTING.. . 291 
2. Seniority allowance — which would be calculated according to 
the number of years worked by the employée in his grade and no 
carrying over of seniority upon promotion allowed. 
3. Family allowance — which would be uniform for ail grades and ail 
dependents. 
4. Cost-of-living allowance — which would be paid on the three 
components listed above according to agreement between the 
Government and the Histadrut. 
As for spécial allowance, an employée would qualify only in 
spécial cases where the work was done under abnormal and temporary 
conditions (e.g. work in the désert, work at night). Overtime work would 
be compensated only by spécial approval and only to employées in 
grades A to O (see Table 1). In grades P to T overtime would constitute 
part of the conditions of the job. Promotions would be conditional on 
the appointment to a new job, or a real change in the nature of the 
présent job. Above ail, only a single grade would be fixed for each 
job instead of the existing practice whereby a range of several grades 
was affixed to the same job. 
THE HOROWITZ REPORT — IMPLEMENTATION AND PROBLEMS 
The collective agreement between the Government and the His-
tadrut, emphasizing mainly the principle of reclassification of ail public 
positions in accordance with the new uniform grading scale and on the 
basis of an objective job évaluation method, was signed on February 3, 
1964.16 Immediately foliowing the signature of the agreement some or-
ganizational arrangements were made in order to begin the opération 
of reclassification. Two bodies were assigned to exécute this opération. 
The first was the « Experts Committee » which included three experts 
in the area of job évaluation, one from the Government, one from the 
Histadrut and one independent person agreed upon by both sides. The 
task of the «Experts Committee» was to prépare by March 31, 1964, a 
detailed analysis of a représentative sample of about 600 key jobs to 
serve as a basis for the overall reclassification. 
The second structure was a large body of committees, the so-
called « Committees of Six, » that were in charge of the actual reclassifi-
16
 «Spécial Collective Agreement for Job Evaluation and Classification of Public 
Service Employées,» BaHistadrut, v. 3, no. 4, April 1964, p. 46. 
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cation opération in each institution. Each committee included six 
members as follows: one représentative from the Civil Service Com-
mission, one from the Center of Local Authorities, one from the 
Civil Servants Labor Union, one from the Clerks Labor Union, one 
executive representing the management of the institution where the 
évaluation was to take place, and one représentative of the employées 
of the same institution. 
The composition of the « Committees of Six » introduced the possi-
bility that the reclassification process would turn into a lengthy séries 
of bargainings and internai deals over how many points were to be 
attached to each job. The «Committees of Six» were also highly 
politicized bodies in which diverse interests clashed. The Government, 
through its représentation via the Civil Service Commission, pushed to 
finish the job as quickly as possible for two main reasons: (a) since 
the establishment of the Horowitz Committee a very damaging at-
mosphère of uncertainty and tension prevailed in the Service, (b) it 
was known that the longer it took to complète the opération of re-
classification, the higher its cost would be. The représentative of the 
institution under investigation was on the one hand very anxious to see 
everything return to normal, yet, on the other, he saw in this opération 
a great opportunity to «reclassify» the status of some positions, name-
ly, to conduct a minor, semi-official, reorganization. 
The four other représentatives were clearly delegates of political 
interests. They represented the interests of the party of the labor union 
with which they happened to be affiliated, and sought to protect the 
positions of their functionaires while their jobs in the institution were 
being evaluated. One need only add to thèse facts the point that thèse 
bodies were expected to reach an almost unanimous agreement (only 
one abstention allowed) and the real complexity becomes apparent. 
Still, the composition of the «Committees of Six» was not the 
only, nor indeed the major, problem in the process of implementing 
the reclassification. The crucial issue was the outright rejection of the 
Horowitz Report by the academicians. 
The academicians basically demanded three things : (a) récognition 
of their professional status and the considération of their éducation in 
their job évaluation, (b) récognition of the possibility of promotion on 
the basis of increased expertise at the same job rather than changes 
of position, (c) the right to organize themselves in separate professional 
unions rather than as a part of the Civil Servants Union. 
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TABLE 1 
The Structure of the Uniform Salary Scale 
Basic Salary Seniority Allowance in Grade Ceiling of Grade 
Grade Annual Rate 
ILjmonth ILImonth Number of Years ILjmonth 
A* 185 5 1 190 
B 195 1 15 300 
C 210 8 15 330 
D 225 8 15 345 
E 240 9 15 375 
F 255 9 15 390 
G 270 10 15 420 
H 290 10 15 440 
I 310 10 15 460 
J 335 11 15 500 
K 365 11 15 530 
L 400 11 14 554 
M 440 12 13 596 
N 480 12 12 624 
0 530 12 11 662 
P 650 12 10 770 
Q 750 12 9 858 
R 850 12 8 946 
S 950 12 7 1,034 
T 1,060 12 6 1.132 
* Transitional grade 
SOURCE: Horowitz Report, p. 15. 
In order to prevent any misinterpretation of the firmness of their 
position the academicians also conducted a warning strike which took 
place on November 19, 1963. The Histadrut was in a serious bind, 
since the union of the academicians was too strong to be pushed around 
and had threatened that its members would quit the Histadrut if forced 
to accept the Horowitz Report recommendations. Thus, the Histadrut 
was forced to accept their demands, a move which had two implications: 
(a) the Histadrut accepted demands which were in contradiction to the 
Horowitz Report which it had previously supported, and (b) the His-
tadrut found itself struggling with the Government for the rights of 
the academicians — a clearly discriminatory policy, benefiting a relative-
ly well-to-do minority within its ranks. 
Once the academicians had the support of the Histadrut, it became 
apparent that the Government would also hâve to give in. And, indeed, 
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on January 2, 1964, the Government agreed to a compromise according 
to which most of the Horowitz Report recommendations would not be 
applied to academicians. This agreement was a major blow to the 
implementation of the Horowitz Report and ail the assumptions under-
lying it. Although it was true that at the time both the Histadrut and 
the Government saw the agreement as a step forward since it removed 
a major obstacle to the completion of the reclassification, in the long 
run it marked the direction for the failure of the whole reform since 
it triggered off once again the same old vicious circle of demands and 
counterdemands between the academicians and the managerial workers, 
the very thing the Horowitz Committee set out to résolve. 
Immediately after the concession to the academicians, the man-
agerial workers became very determined not to lag behind, and they 
pressed for a substantial automatic increase as a resuit of the reclas-
sification. It then became the academicians' turn to protest the «inap-
propriate differentials» between fhe managers' salaries and their own, 
and they demanded an automatic increase. In short, the same old game 
had started ail over again. 
THE HOROWITZ REPORT — RIGIDITIES AND SHORTCOMINGS 
In a prepared address given two and a half years after the sub-
mission of the Report the head of the Committee, David Horowitz, 
summarized the main reasons for the failure of the plan : 
The System of évaluation of jobs was introduced to be carried into effect 
by parity committees with ail the concomitant pressures, bargaining and 
distortions by pressure groups. The moment the System of classification 
of jobs by bargaining was introduced... the battle for the implementation 
of the Report was lost. The results do not reflect the slightest similarity 
with the recommendations of the Committee.... Most of the distortions 
which the Committee tried to eliminate remain in force. ... It was not the 
implementation of the Report, but its complète négation.I7 
Thus, David Horowitz pointed to the «Committees of Six» as 
the major cause of the reform's failure. It seems to me that someone 
so familiar with the Israeli political system as was Horowitz should 
hâve foreseen that such would be the case. The Committee was trapped 
by the technical langauge defining its task in the letter of appointment 
and did not look at the political implications involved in the recom-
17
 David HOROWITZ, «Address at the Plenary Session of the World Wizo 
Executive,» January 25, 1966, p. 3-8. (Mimeographed) 
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mendations. It is surprising that the Committee did not test the political 
feasibility of implementing such a reform since one of a similar nature 
failed to work in the past (a uniform wage scale was first established 
in 1949). Why did the Committee not question the reasons for the failure 
then, and how they could be avoided in the new plan? Had anything 
substantial changed in the social and political conditions in which the 
public institutions operated to encourage the belief that success would 
be achieved this time? 
In addition to the wage politicking that was at work and which 
helped bury the Report, there were three very important shortcomings 
in it: (a) the issue of wage differentials, (b) the weights of the criteria, 
and (c) wage progressions and/or pay-grade rate ranges. 
(a) Wage differentials — One of the major value premises on 
which the Committee founded its recommendations was «equal pay for 
work of equal value. » This statement was based upon the slogan 
«equal pay for equal work,» and the Committee used them inter-
changeably. However, there is a serious différence between the two. 
The intention of the slogan «equal pay for equal work» was to prevent 
Personal discrimination on the basis of sex, race or religion, among 
persons doing the same kind of work. The new version has several 
implications which are not at ail related to the original. It implies, for 
instance, that there are jobs of différent value, some inferior and some 
superior, whose status cannot be changed by any amount of personal 
effort or dévotion. This is a total négation of the dominant conception 
in Israël invoked by the prevailing socialist ideology, that ail labor is 
of value, and that man should not feel inferior as long as he performs 
it with responsibility and dévotion. It should be noted that, according 
to the new version, not only were some jobs rendered inferior to others, 
there was no room for rewarding someone for his personal efforts. 
Another implication of this value premise is that, since the 
differentials between grades would be assessed on the basis of an 
objective criterion, once they are determined they should not be in-
fluenced by «non-objective» pressures like political demands, social 
needs, or the conditions in the labor market. An employée who is 
graded low on the scale and receives low wages, should accept this 
inferior status since he deserves it, given the inferior value of his work. 
The just solution has already been established for him on the basis 
of an «objective criterion,» and he has no business «revolting» against 
the System by initiating labor struggles for equal wages or changes in 
job évaluation. The contention of being able to assess differentials 
between grades on the basis of an «objective criterion» contradicts 
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principle (d) (see page 8) which claims that differentials will be deter-
mined by taking into account social factors, unless the assumption is 
that there are crystallized and stable conceptions prevailing in the Israeli 
society as to what constitutes acceptable differentials, so as to serve 
as an undisputed basis for determining reasonable différences between 
grades. 
In this context of wage differentials it is interesting to cite the 
opinion of one expert who visited Israël just before the publication 
of the Report.18 In explaining the principles of the national wage policy 
in Israël which emerged at that time, Milton Derber cited the principle 
of « establishing a wage structure in which occupational différences 
reflected différences in skill and educational requirements but did not 
encourage class distinctions.»19 
In référence to the évaluation of the success of establishing a 
social concensus with regard to wage differentials Derber wrote : « The 
least successful component of the wage policy dealt with wage structure, 
as evidenced by the conflicts in the public sector generated by pressure 
from salaried professional and administrative employées,» and he 
attributed this lack of success to «the inability thus far to achieve a 
stable balance between the values of the traditional labor leadership 
(notwithstanding a healthy streak of pragmatism) and the values of the 
new university-trained middle-class. »2() 
Indeed, the labor leadership at the time made its opinion clear 
on the issue of wage differentials. In March 1962, the General Secretary 
of the Histadrut, A. Becker, said: 
The main argument with the professionals is that they want to increase 
the wage gap whilst we want to keep it the same or at least in keeping with 
the state's capacities.21 
Of spécifie interest in this analysis is that, after ail the déclarations 
to the effect that the Horowitz Committee was set up to establish a 
just and sound wage policy for ail civil servants, the spokesman for 
the Ministry of Finance revealed in a moment of truth in 1965, when 
most stages of the reclassification had been completed, that the Horo-
18
 Milton DERBER, «National Wage Policy in Israël, 1948-62,» Quarterly 
Review of Economies and Business, v. 3, no. 3, Autumn 1963, p. 47-60. 
19
 Ibid., p. 56. 
20
 Ibid., p. 57. 
21
 Milton DERBER, «Israel's Wage Differentials: A Persisting Problem,» 
Midstream, March 1963, p. 11. 
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witz Committee had really been established to correct the salary 
differential of the managerial workers since it had been distorted before-
hand in favor of the academicians.22 Ail of this makes one wonder 
whether the real intention behind the establishment of the Horowitz 
Committee was not simply a médium by which to devise a disguise 
of impartiality behind which the political need to respond to the 
pressures of the managerial workers would be carried out. 
(b) The weights of the criteria — From the description of the 
job évaluation which was introduced in the public sector in Israël it 
is obvious that we are dealing with a straight point method of job 
évaluation. Each of the eight criteria or factors has an equal number 
of points. Being equally weighted, the factors hâve no différences in 
value. The advocator of this method, Professor Guttman, praised it 
because : « There was no need for the tampering with items and weights 
on the part of ad hoc committees which was ail too usual when other 
forms were used.»23 
The fact that the method which Guttman advocated is free of 
tampering from ad hoc committees, and the fact that the field research 
he conducted proved at that point in time that the factors relate to each 
other in an equal weight, does not necessarily prove that this method 
is the optimal one. It could very well be that at a différent time thèse 
factors would hâve related to each other in a différent fashion. It is 
very possible that with a given change in économie development, or 
some changes in the values of the society, some of the factors would 
receive more weight than others, and therefore, the rigidity of equal 
weights to the factors would not serve the purpose of realistic job 
évaluation. Indeed, as Zollitsch and Langsner point out, there is a shift 
from the straight point method to the weighted point method : 
The straight point method is now used very little because uniformity in 
the number of points for each factor rarely indicates the relative importance 
of each factor as compared with the other factors. ... The weighted point 
method is widely used because, as explained before, in the majority of jobs 
and positions, certain factors are of much more value than others.24 
(c) Wage progression and/or pay-grade rate ranges — One of the 
basic changes which the Horowitz Committee recommended was the 
22
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establishment of a single grade for each job instead of the existing 
practice whereby a range of several grades was affixed to the same 
job.2 5 The main reason for introducing this change was to eliminate 
some inequities which were created in the civil service as a resuit of 
paygrade ranges. In addition, the Committee thought to eliminate the 
possibility of using the ranges for purposes of favoritism and other 
undesirable usages. The only performance or merit wage increases 
which the Committee recommended were through job changing. This 
recommendation drew much criticism, especially from the academicians, 
and rightfully so. 
The theory behind having a merit progression System and/or a 
paygrade-wage spread is that it can serve as an incentive to motivate 
employées to perform at greater efficiency. It also enables the employer 
to grant wage increases on the basis of the individual's performance, 
that is, the personal contributions or demonstrated abilities of the 
employée. The changes which the Committee recommended introduced 
excess rigidity in the system, encouraged mediocrity, and were in 
complète négation of modern-day theory of compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
The recommendations and implementation of the Horowitz 
Report had two main purposes: (a) to improve the labor relations 
atmosphère and reduce the number of strikes, (b) to simplify the wage 
structure. As far as the first objective is concerned, it is clear to ail 
who hâve followed the situation in Israël since 1965 that this objective 
was not achieved. Fréquent strikes were perhaps the most severe 
disease of the Israeli économie system before the Report as well as 
after the attempt to implement it. 
With regard to the second objective, there are some who believe 
that it was achieved. To me this claim seems questionable. Even if 
it were true that the number of wage scales was reduced considerably 
and that a uniform scale was established as a gênerai frame of référence, 
the following is also true: it does not apply to ail public servants 
as intended; and, for those to whom it does apply, it does so in a very 
minor way since most of them had acquired spécial allowances accord-
ing to their labor union affiliation, a situation which, as a matter of 
fact, constituted a major déviation from the proclaimed standardization 
25
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and generality of the wage structure. Finally, the rigidities which were 
embodied in the uniform scale did not advance the cause of labor 
tranquility in the public sector. 
Furthermore, even if we accept the claim that a simplification 
of the wage structure was achieved, the major question which arises 
is whether the price was not too high. Would the Government and the 
Histadrut hâve gone ahead with such a reform if they had known before-
hand that this would be its only achievement? I do not think so. Even 
those who voiced their opinion in favor of the reform admit that its cost 
was far above the three percent wage increase (an estimated I.L. 
30,000,000) suggested by the Horowitz Report, and approached a figure 
doser to I.L. 600,000,000. The foes of the reform estimated that the 
total increase in the wage bill was in the area of I.L. 2,000,000,000. 
Since the work and ideas of the Horowitz Committee were greatly 
influenced by the nationwide job évaluation in The Netherlands, it is 
interesting to reassess Martin P. Oettinger's conclusions about the 
Dutch expérience in the light of the Israeli trial. Oettinger argued in his 
article that the need for strong government intervention to implement 
the Dutch system made it an impossible and undesirable one to be 
transferred to the United States.26 The Israeli expérience reinforces 
this position ; even with greater governmental intervention and a smaller 
économie system than that of The Netherlands, the success of such a 
method is doubtful. 
Even more interesting is Oettinger's attack on the claims of the 
Dutch method as being a «scientific» method which can yield results 
with a high degree of accuracy. As was discussed earlier, one of the 
stumbling blocks in the way of smooth adaptation of the Horowitz 
Report was the rigid approach in its implementation caused by the 
delusion that the method represented the discovery of scientific truth. 
In summary, it seems to me that the value of large scale job 
évaluation (sectoral or nationwide) is much more limited than claimed by 
those who hâve tried it, and much more expérience and research are 
needed in order to arrive at the optimal method. 
26
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L'évaluation des emplois et la 
fixation des salaires dans le secteur public en Israël 
L'article ci-dessus traite de l'évaluation des emplois et de la fixation des salaires 
dans le secteur public en Israël. 
L'Auteur donne d'abord un aperçu du contexte historique et économique dans 
lequel cette entreprise s'est engagée. Après l'établissement d'Israël en 1948, on se met 
à l'œuvre en vue de former un corps de fonctionnaires. Au départ, la fonction publique 
comprenait l'ensemble des employés de l'État, à l'exception des travailleurs manuels, 
des enseignants et des policiers. On met au point un système de classification des 
emplois qu'adoptèrent ensuite les communautés locales. À cette classification était 
également attachée une échelle des traitements qui, sous la pression des syndicats et 
des associations professionnelles, subit diverses modifications. Ce processus atteignit son 
point culminant vers 1961-1962, période au cours de laquelle il n'y eut pas moins de 
vingt-deux grèves de la part de différents groupes d'employés de la fonction publique. 
C'est alors que le gouvernement, pour parer à cet état de perturbation, institua la 
Commission Horowitz à un moment où les pressions inflationnistes et l'instabilité 
économique hypothéquaient lourdement le pays. 
La Commission se rendit compte qu'une de ses tâches principales devait être 
d'éliminer les distortions, qui s'étaient accentuées au fil des années, dans les taux de 
salaire selon les grades, les professions et les lieux de travail. Les membres de la Com-
mission cherchèrent des solutions à cette situation. Même si sa compétence ne s'étendait 
qu'aux employés de la fonction publique et des municipalités, ses recommandations 
devaient toucher en pratique 179,000 employés du secteur public sur une main-d'œuvre 
globale de 800,000 travailleurs. 
Le rapport de la Commission était fondé sur quatre principes: un traitement 
satisfaisant qui tenait compte des besoins des employés et des possibilités de l'économie 
nationale, un salaire égal pour un travail égal, la simplification de la structure des sa-
laires, enfin l'établissement d'écarts normaux à l'intérieur des échelles. 
Dans l'établissement de son système d'évaluation des emplois, la Commission fut 
aidée par un de ses membres, le professeur Louis Guttman, qui avait précédemment 
participé à un important travail d'évaluation des tâches dont le rapport avait été soumis 
en 1960. Dans ce rapport, le professeur Guttman avait tenté de s'attaquer au problème 
d'établir un système d'évaluation des tâches qui permettait l'inclusion de postes divers 
dans une échelle applicable à tous les postes d'une industrie, d'un secteur d'activité, 
voire de l'économie nationale dans son ensemble. 
Selon le point de vue de Guttman, le choix des critères d'évaluation devait ré-
pondre à trois exigences: comporter une analyse de l'emploi, exprimer le niveau de 
progression dans le travail et exprimer le niveau de travail en termes qui ne reposeraient 
pas sur la hiérarchie de travail. À partir de ces principes, on retenait huit critères: 
la personnalité et l'initiative, le jugement, les relations avec le public, l'expression, 
l'indépendance, l'expérience, les connaissances générales et professionnelles, l'effort 
physique. Chacun de ces critères comprenait de quatre à sept grades dont les points 
étaient alloués suivant une progression arithmétique. En combinant les critères et les 
grades, on pouvait obtenir un moule dans lequel il était possible de couler tous les 
postes. 
L ' É V A L U A T I O N DES EMPLOIS ET LA FIXATION DES SALAIRES 301 
À partir de là, un comité fut chargé d'établir une échelle de salaires uniforme 
qui comprenait vingt échelons. Elle devait s'appliquer à tous les fonctionnaires de l'État, 
aux employés des municipalités et des organisations religieuses. Les taux de salaires 
devaient contenir quatre éléments: un salaire de base, incluant le traitement touché 
jusque-là ainsi que les allocations s'y rattachant, une allocation d'ancienneté, des allo-
cations familiales uniformes, une indemnité de vie chère. 
Une convention fut alors conclue entre le gouvernement et l'Histadrut dont l'objet 
principal était la reclassification de tous les postes de la fonction publique en accord 
avec l'échelle de salaires précédente après une étude objective- d'évaluation des em-
plois. Cette tâche fut assignée à deux organismes, un comité de spécialistes qui était 
responsable de l'évaluation des emplois et répartit l'ensemble des emplois en quelque 
600 positions-clés et des comités de six membres chargés de l'application des règles 
de classification dans chaque institution. 
La composition des «comités des six» eut pour résultat toute une série de lon-
gues tractations au sujet du nombre de points à être accodés à chaque poste. Il s'agis-
sait là de comités fortement politisés au sein desquels les intérêts s'entre-choquaient. 
Étant donné le climat d'incertitude et de tension qui existait la Commission de la fonction 
publique voulait procéder rapidement. Les autres représentants avaient des intérêts 
surtout politiques, puisqu'ils appartenaient au parti auquel leur association était affiliée 
et cherchaient naturellement à protéger les intérêts de leurs mandats au moment de 
l'évaluation de leur emploi. 
Ce ne fut pas là le seul contretemps. Plus grave fut le rejet du rapport de la 
Commission Horwitz par les universitaires. Ceux-ci réclamaient trois choses: la re-
connaissance de leur statut professionnel et la retenue de leur scolarité comme critères 
d'évaluation, la reconnaissance du principe de la promotion dans un même emploi plutôt 
que mutation, le droit de se grouper dans leurs propres associations professionnelles. 
Pour appuyer cette réclamation, les universitaires ont déclenché une grève d'avertisse-
ment et, comme leur syndicat était fort, l'Histadrut ne pouvait pas les obliger à re-
noncer à leurs demandes qui contredisaient le rapport Horowitz, ce qui conduisit à 
l'acceptation d'un compromis. Par suite des concessions accordées aux universitaires 
(professionnels) les cadres, à leur tour, demandèrent une majoration de salaire substan-
tielle comme conséquence de leur reclassification. 
C'est ainsi que le rapport Horowitz s'avéra en définitive un échec. Horowitz 
accusa les «comités des six» d'être les grands responsables de cet échec, mais on peut 
aussi reprocher à la Commission de ne pas avoir prévu les conséquences politiques 
de son rapport. Outre cette cause, on peut encore indiquer trois autres motifs d'in-
succès: l'enjeu de l'établissement des différences de salaires, la valeur des critères 
utilisés et la progression des taux de salaires à l'intérieur des échelles. Le principe 
« salaire égal à travail égal » ne laissait aucune possibilité de récompenser le mérite et 
le recours à une étude objective des tâches ne pouvait pas normalement laisser la porte 
ouverte à la possibilité de tenir compte de facteurs sociaux. D'autre part, la valeur des 
critères reposait sur la méthode des points directs, chacun des huit critères compre-
nant un nombre égal de points, d'où il résulte que les facteurs ne différaient pas en 
valeur. Ceci ne pouvait que conduire à des tensions dès qu'un changement pouvait se 
produire dans le développement économique et dans les valeurs reconnues dans la 
société. Quant à la progression des taux de salaires, on voulait éliminer la possibilité 
de recourir aux marges dans des buts de favoritisme. La Commission n'ayant recom-
mandé le système du salaire au mérite que, dans les changements d'emploi, cette 
méthode fut durement critiquée par les universitaires. 
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Quelle conclusion l'auteur tire-t-il de son analyse? Le rapport Horowitz avait deux 
buts: l'amélioration de l'atmosphère des relations professionnelles et la réduction du 
nombre des grèves ainsi que la simplification de la structure des salaires. D'une part, 
que le nombre des grèves n'a pas diminué. Quant au deuxième objectif, il faut recon-
naître que le nombre des échelles de salaires a été diminué et qu'une échelle uniforme 
fut utilisée comme cadre de référence, mais celle-ci ne s'appliquait pas à tous les em-
ployés publics et, pour ceux à qui elle s'est appliquée, elle n'a eu que peu d'influence, 
d'où il ressort que le coût en fut exorbitant. 
La même chose avait été entreprise aux Pays-Bas avec assez peu de succès ; 
l'expérience d'Israël confirme ce fait. 
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